As I have written often and recently, the competitive position of the US legacy carriers in the global arena is a major concern to me. My thoughts on this topic are largely contained in a talk I gave at the ACI-NA International Aviation Issues Seminar in late November click here.

With the combined market capitalizations of the Big 3 EU legacy carriers (Air France/KLM, Lufthansa and British Airways) exceeding the market capitalizations of the Big 6 US legacy carriers (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Airways) combined by nearly 33%, something clearly needs to change. And if Air France/KLM is successful in integrating troubled Alitalia into its fold, then the margin will become even more embarrassing for airlines carrying the US flag.

What a Cool Job

If there is a job I want in the airline space today, it would be the UPS whiteboard guy click here. Why? Because the UPS model, and the way they talk about it in their whiteboard campaign, demonstrates the futility of US carriers trying to operate successfully under collective bargaining provisions that are at least 35 years old. The UPS guy is not encumbered by existing lines or parameters as he connects UPS’s dots on the map. More importantly, the company actually connects the product to what customers want and demand –a novel concept! If there is a time to throw the past away (erase) and look to the future (redraw), it is now.

So maybe, just maybe, the Allied Pilots Association is on to something in its latest proposal to American Airlines. While I would never suggest that the APA “one liner” scope provision click here makes sense for the AA network as we know it today, anything that simplifies the ability of US airlines to implement commercial, tactical and strategic decisions to react to a changing domestic and global landscape makes very good sense to me. More importantly, anything that gets the mainline growing again is the best solution to some of the labor-related hostilities in the industry today.

Whiteboard Analysis – Regional and Codeshare Flying

What I like about the simplicity of the APA proposal is that it provides a starting point to begin serious negotiations – something the American Airlines negotiations are sorely lacking.

Given that scope defines who can do what flying necessary to operate the network, AA would get to go to the “whiteboard” and lay out for the APA the cost for feeder flying relative to the revenue generated by that flying, as well as the traffic and revenue contributions to its mainline domestic and international routes. As part of AA’s whiteboard exercise, they also get to demonstrate the value of revenue and traffic contribution the international codesharing partners now contribute.

If APA puts forward a scope proposal that reserves all flying for its member pilots and that makes economic sense, then there would be no need to scale back the current size of the network – all other things being equal. On the other hand, if APA is not willing to agree to terms – pay rates and work rules – that, when the interdependencies of all contractual issues are understood and at least match what AA pays today for this business, then the company would need to make some decisions about how much to shrink the current network.

Whiteboard Analysis – Mainline Flying

Let’s take it further.

The cost of the APA flying will ultimately determine the size of the network for regional and codeshare flying. The next calculation is the cost of operating the existing, or remaining, mainline network. If the network can sustain the 50+ percent increase in rates and all other items included in the union’s current proposal, then the APA will have realized its goal of restoring lost earning power to their members and establishing the pattern for the rest of the industry to follow.

Based on the cost of operating the mainline network under the APA proposal, there are two paths to explore on the decision tree: 1) if the remaining network cannot incorporate the cost of the entire APA proposal, then determine what portions can be operated profitably and the remaining network would need to be dismantled; or 2) determine how much increase in pilot cost the network could absorb and then ask the APA to adjust its proposal downward.

Whiteboard Analysis – What Is the Right Formula for US Legacy and LCCs?

This conversation is underway not only in union halls, but also on Wall Street and in corporate boardrooms. It is a topic on the Dallas Morning News’ airline blog click here. While Mr. Maxon sees the APA proposal is a bombshell, I see it as a starting point for negotiation that appears to be stuck. Historically, scope language is among the last issues negotiated in pilot contracts. Let’s switch it up this time and figure out exactly what unions want their respective companies to be - global leaders or niche players?

We talk a lot here about CEOs that are genuinely concerned about value creation versus value destruction – Glenn Tilton at UAL, Doug Parker at US Airways and Richard Anderson at Delta. But another CEO has been hard at work totally rethinking his business as well: Gary Kelly at Southwest. This past week, Kelly spoke directly to the “perils” facing the industry click here. Kelly and his pilots are also engaged in a discussion of scope language as their business is about to get more complicated with proposals for international flying and code shares as a way to boost revenue production.

With little to no clear investment thesis in the core business of airlines, UAL this week declared a special dividend to its shareholders click here, much to the chagrin of its employees and a very passionate Holly Hegeman who writes about the action in her blog, Planebuzz click here. If nothing else, Tilton and UAL are consistent in their focus on the shareholder – often the most ignored of stakeholders in the airline industry. While I can see the employee view, at-risk compensation is a way around this angst.

So unless the business of the business starts to have a clearer line of sight to the customer – meaning delivering a product that the customer is willing to pay more for – then the payment of special dividends, the selling of wholly owned subsidiaries, consolidation and/or a slow liquidation of US flag airlines will continue. You know, money talks and #$*&! walks.

Concluding Thoughts

I really think the APA is on to something with its scope proposal. Let’s talk about scope first among the tough questions that will determine the future shape of the US airlines. Once that question is answered we can move on to a meaningful discussion about how to better compensate a workforce because the current seniority-based, hourly rate system simply is not effective in the modern market.

Structured properly, this round of negotiations may just lead to finding the right network architecture to make the US carriers global leaders again. Or not. But doing business circa 1970 is not going to get it done. So let’s remove the clutter and the underbrush and start with a clean whiteboard. Maybe even do what the European carriers do and create business units that carry cost structures to match the sub markets they serve because they recognize that a one size fits all just does not work. And this approach could indeed be done with pilots on the APA list – just ask Northwest and US Airways.

Let’s stop saying it just cannot happen. It can.